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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 7, 1985, four Palestinian terrorists aboard the Italian
vessel Achille Lauro seized the ship thirty miles north of Port Said.'
The seizure began a dramatic series of events. The terrorists demanded
the release of Palestinian prisoners 2 and entry into Syria. During the
takeover the terrorists killed one of the twenty-eight United States
citizens aboard and threatened others.3
After failing to achieve their demands, the terrorists returned
the vessel to Egypt where they surrendered and were taken into custody
by Egyptian authorities.4 They remained in Egypt awaiting their release
pursuant to an alleged agreement between Egypt and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO). Subsequently, on October 11, while
on board an Egyptian airliner bound for Tunis,5 United States Navy
F-14 fighter planes intercepted the terrorists and forced them to land
at Sigonella airbase in Sicily. 6 Upon their arrival in Sicily, the terrorists
were taken into custody by Italian authorities to await indictment
and prosecution.7
The complex series of events leading to the interception of the
Egyptian airliner is but one example of how the world community
combats international terrorism. Since the 1976 Israeli raid on En-
tebbe, over ten major attempts to use force against terrorism have
been undertaken.' Although the Achille Lauro incident raises many
Eastern College 1981; Fulbright Scholar, University of Hamburg, West Germany
1981-82; J.D. Temple University 1985.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
2 Id.
The Voyage of the Achille Lauro, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 30-31.
4 Id. at 33.
5 The U.S. Sends a Message, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 22. The terrorists and their
alleged leader Abdul Abbas were being flown to Tunis under an agreement between
Egypt and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) under which Egypt would
release the individuals into PLO custody. Id.
6 Id.
The events became more complex when Italy allowed the alleged ring-leader
of the plot, Mohammad Abbas, to leave for Yugoslavia two days later. Abbas was
allegedly carrying an Iraqui diplomatic passport. After Abbas was permitted to flee
Italy, Italian authorities issued an arrest warrant for him, charging him with murder,
kidnapping, hijacking, and the transportation and possession of arms and explosives.
Abbas' release sparked untold controversy, including the near collapse of Italy's
coalition government. Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 27, 1985, at 3-A, col. 3. Abbas'
release presents many questions of international extradition law which are beyond
the scope of this Article.




questions under international law, this Article focuses on only two
aspects: (1) the international jurisdictional bases available to the
United States and the inherent discrepancies therein, and (2) the
validity of exercising jurisdiction by forcible means under the prin-
ciples of international law.
II. CLAIMS OF JURISDICTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Jurisdiction Over International Crimes
Jurisdiction permits a state, under international law, to prescribe
or enforce rules of law. 9 The international community recognizes
different forms of jurisdiction. Prescriptive jurisdiction allows a state
to make rules of law, either through the legislative branch or through
some other branch of government. 0 Enforcement jurisdiction permits
a state under international law to enforce a rule of law using the
executive or judicial branches." Generally, states do not have juris-
diction to enforce a rule of law unless they have jurisdiction to
prescribe a rule. 2
The law of nations permits the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by
a state under five general principles: territorial, national, protective,
passive personality, and universality.' 3 Under the territorial principle,
jurisdiction is based on the place where the offense was committed. 4
National jurisdiction is based on the nationality or national character
of the offender.' Jurisdiction under the protective principle is based
on whether the national interest,' 6 security, territorial integrity, or
political independence of the state was affected. 7 Although terrorist
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 6 (1965).
Id. at comment a.
Id. See also Zagaris and Rosenthal, United States Jurisdictional Considerations
in International Law, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 303, 316 (1985).
12 S.S. Lotus, (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10; Judgment of Sept.
7. Hudson, The Sixth Year of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 22
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1927); United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255 (lst Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983). It should be noted that the scope of this Article
concerns only the enforcement mechanisms employed by the United States, since no
question has been raised concerning the United States capacity to legislate on ter-
rorism.
1" Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681, cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981).
14 Rivard, 375 F.2d at 885 n.5.
" Id. at n.6.
6 Id. at n.7.
17 Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 35, 44 (Supp. 1935).
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acts such as the seizure of the Achille Lauro cause considerable
repercussions to the security of United States citizens abroad,' 8 it is
unlikely that this incident injured the territorial integrity of the United
States. 9 The passive personality principle bases jurisdiction on the
nationality or national character of the victim2° and provides a strong
base for instituting enforcement action in the Achille Lauro incident,
since one United States citizen was killed and others threatened. For
example, Israel used the passive personality principal to justify the
seizure of Adolf Eichmann in 1960.21 Eichmann, responsible for
"Dienstelle Eichmann, ' ' 22 was charged with the murder of millions
of Jews during the Second World War. 2 Eichmann fled to Argentina
during the War where he was later captured by Israeli nationals and
taken to Israel to be tried for war crimes.24 Israel claimed various
grounds for jurisdiction," but concluded that jurisdiction over Eich-
mann should be based solely on the national character of the victims. 26
The final basis of jurisdiction is the universality principle. 27 This
basis for jurisdiction holds that all nations may pursue criminals
Article 7 provides: Protection - Security of the State. "A State has jurisdiction
with respect to any crime committed outside its territory by an alien against the
security, territorial integrity or political independence of that State, provided that
the act or omission which constitutes the crime was not committed in exercise of a
liberty guaranteed the alien by the law of the place where it was committed." Id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIoNs LAW § 33 (1965) and Note,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction Following Forcible Abduction: A New
Israeli Precedent in International Law, 72 MicH. L. REV. 1087 (1974).1" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 33 (1965).
'9 McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 243 (1984).
20 Rivard, 375 F.2d at 885, n.9; United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373
(IIth Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 685 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, Pauth-
Arzuza v. United States, 459 U.S. 1114 (1982).
21 Silving, In re Eichmann: A Dilemma of Law and Morality, 55 AM. J. INT'L
L. 307, 331 (1961).
22 The authority to deal with the "Jewish question."
23 Silving, supra note 21, at 312.
24 N.Y. Times, May 25, 1960, at 1, col. 5.
25 Silving, supra note 21, at 330; infra note 26.
26 Some authorities criticize the notion of basing jurisdiction solely on the national
character of the victims. See McDouGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 719 (1%1); HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN
POLICY 272-73 (2d ed. 1979); see also Kittrie, A Post Mortem of the Eichmann Case
- the Lessons for International Law, 55 J. CriM. L., Crim. and Pol. Sci. 16 (1964).
27 Kittrie, supra note 26; McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 719; Garcia-
Mora, Crimes Against Peace in International Law: From Nuremberg to the Present,
53 Ky. L.J. 35 (1964).
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charged with heinous crimes recognized by the law of nations.28
Custody gives the state jurisdiction to try and punish the offender.2 9
The universality principle usually relates to offenses defined in in-
ternational conventions. Under these conventions nations agree to
prosecute and punish certain crimes irrespective of the place of the
offense.30 Offenders may be nationals of other states, foreign dom-
iciliaries, or individuals without permanent residence.3' Crimes subject
to jurisdiction under the universality principle include the inhumane
treatment of prisoners of war,32 piracy,3 3 drug 3 or slave trafficking,"
and aircraft hijacking.3 6
Since these crimes tend to have a broad effect on the order of the
world community as a whole,37 most nations have significant interests
in prosecuting suspected offenders. Although nations may use the
universality principle as a basis for jurisdiction in a variety of criminal
actions, 3 disputes still exist as to whether terrorist attacks and crimes
' United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981); McDouGAL
& FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 719.
29 Rivard, 375 F.2d at 885 n.8.
"o 2 M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
33, n.38 (1973).
31 Id.
32 Geneva Red Cross Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No.
3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
3 Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, art. 9, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
2317, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 449 U.N.T.S. 311.
14 Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, done
Dec. 11, 1946, 61 Stat. 2230, T.I.A.S. No. 1671, 12 U.N.T.S. 179; Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, done Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520
U.N.T.S. 151.
35 Supplemental Convention on Slave Trafficking, done Sept. 25, 1926, 41 Stat.
2183, T.S. No. 778 (amended 7 U.S.T. 479, T.I.A.S. No. 3532).
-6 Convention on Offenses Committed on Board Aircraft, done Sept. 14, 1963,
Art. 3, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter referred
to as the Tokyo Convention]. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft, done Dec. 16, 1970, art. 4, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 [here-
inafter cited as the Hague Convention]. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done Sept. 23, 1971, art. 5, 24 U.S.T.
565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 [hereinafter cited as the Montreal Convention].
.7 McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 719. See also Garcia-Mora, Criminal
Jurisdiction of A State Over Fugitives Brought From A Foreign Country Force or
Fraud, 32 IND. L.J. 427 (1957); Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in
Violation of International Law, 29 BRIT. Y.B. lNr'L L. 265 (1952); Zagaris and
Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 310.
" Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRaIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 161
(1972-73) where the author notes that hijacking is probably not covered by the
definition of piracy in international law.
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relating to terrorism should fall under the realm of this jurisdiction.39
It is against the backdrop of varying theories of jurisdiction that the
crime in question must be defined, since one problem in establishing
a jurisdictional base over acts of international terrorism is the dif-
ficulty of defining the terrorist acts themselves. 4°
B. Crimes Against Humanity
Classical writers in international law such as Grotius recognized
that certain offenses may be categorized as abhorrent to all nations. 41
When individuals act with the intent to violate a fundamental interest
or right protected by international law, 42 the act may not be adequately
punished under the normal criminal jurisdiction of the state. 43 Where
the exercise of domestic jurisdiction is inadequate, extensions of
jurisdiction based on the universality principle have been permitted
under international law." For example, states have established tri-
bunals for the trial of grave offenses that a national tribunal does
not ordinarily entertain. 45 States also may assert jurisdiction over
offenses committed by aliens abroad if nations are affected. 46 Yet,
international criminal law and the concept of deliciti juris gentium 47
involve theoretical problems. Professor Schwarzenberger has sug-
gested that international law should acknowledge the presence of
international crimes. International criminal law, however, assumes
that authority may be exerted over world powers, and thus ignores
the veto provisions contained in the United Nations Charter.48 Another
problem with the establishment of a clear body of international crime
is the distinction between offenses committed by states and individ-
uals. Previous jurists have acknowledged the existence of international
criminal law, but limited its scope to interstate relations (droit penal
interetaique). 49 Such law seeks to repress acts by states which are
' See Note, supra note 17, at 1099.
See M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 478-79
(1975); Dugard, Towards the Definition of International Terrorism, 67 AM. Soc.
INT'L L. PRcO. 96 (1973); M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, supra note 30.
41 H. GROTIUS, 2 DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 504 (Carnegie ed.).
42 This includes the knowledge that the act may violate a fundamental interest.
43 G. MUELLER & E. WISE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 260 (1965).
. Id.
4 Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (1947).
G. MUELLER & E. WISE, supra note 43, at 260.
47 Offense against the law of nations.
49 Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 CURRENT
LEGAL PROB. 263 (1950).




violative of the "fundamental interests of the moral and material
order." 50
The decision of the Nuremberg Tribunal after World War II,
however, has heavily influenced modern international criminal law.5'
The Nuremberg Tribunal established the principle that criminal re-
sponsibility for crimes against humanity, especially war crimes, should
fall on individuals, not states. 52 Such "[c]rimes against international
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provision of
international law be enforced." 53 Under the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal,5 4 crimes against humanity include:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman
acts against any civilian population, or persecutions on political,
racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such per-
secutions are carried on in execution of or in connection [sic] with
any crime against peace or any war crime."
The Charter created individual criminal liability for these acts, whether
committed during war56 or in times of peace.57 Additional responsi-
bility for these crimes fell on those who conspired in or organized
the perpetration of these crimes.5 The principles of the Nuremberg
Tribunal, formulated by the International Law Commission in 1950,
had been previously adopted by the General Assembly59 and subse-
quently considered customary international law by some nations. 60
Although the competence to assert jurisdiction over individuals ac-
cused of crimes against humanity exists, the accused has a right to
a fair trial on the facts and the law. 6'
Following the Nuremberg decisions, the United Nations promul-
I' d.
" TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL, Nuremberg (1947).
52 Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 374,
Principle 1 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Nuremberg Principles]; see 11 M. WHITEMAN,
DIGEST INTERNATIONAL LAW 838-39 (1968).
" Nuremberg Principles, supra note 52, at 374, comment 99.
14 Supra note 51, at vol. 1, art. 6(c).
" Nuremberg Principles, supra note 52, at 377, Principle VI(e).
56 Id. at comment 120.
" Id. at comment 123.
I d. at 375, Principle II1.
G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1946).
See Eichmann v. Attorney General of the Government of Israel (1946), 361
I.L.R. 277, 296 (1962) and Boyle, Upholding International Law in the Middle East
in 7 TERRORISM, AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 515 (Alexander ed. 1984-85).
61 Nuremberg Principles, supra note 52, at 375, Principle V.
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gated the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind. 62 Although the Draft Code adopted the principle of indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity, 63 it is also
concerned with state actions. 64 Article 2(6) includes, as an offense
against mankind, the "undertaking or encouragement by the au-
thorities of a State of terrorist activities in another State, or the
toleration by the authorities of a State of organized activities cal-
culated to carry out terroristic acts in another state."' 65 While this
provision primarily deals with state-organized terrorism directed against
another state, 66 certain evidence suggests that organized terrorist groups
and persons in such groups can be liable under the provision. 67 The
Draft Code does not address the question of whether a state's failure
to apprehend and prosecute terrorists is an international offense. 6
However, acts by private individuals against a civilian population,
such as murder69 or conspiracy or incitement to this murder, 70 are
crimes against international peace. Commentators have suggested that
if a distinction exists between the Draft Code and international penal
law, the Draft Code must be more narrowly construed. 7' Naturally,
certain international offenses do not endanger the peace and security
of mankind. 72 Although he acknowledges that a specific provision
including such offenses is not present within the Draft Code, Pella
has suggested that the Code embodies both the Nuremberg principles
and offenses against the peace and security of mankind. 73 Clearly,
62 Text of the Draft Code is featured in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 134-37 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as Draft Code].
63 Id. Art. I provides: "Offenses against the peace and security of mankind, as
defined in this Code, are crimes under international law, for which the responsible
individuals shall be punishable." Id. at 134. See also Garcia-Amador, State Re-
sponsibility in the Light of the New Trends of International Law, 49 AM. J. INT'L
L. 339, 345-46 (1955); Johnson, The Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, 4 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 445, 460-61 (1955).
" Draft Code, supra note 62, art. 2, at 135-37.
65 Id. at 135.
M Id. at comment to art. 2(6). The International Law Commission noted that
art. 2(12) is the applicable section with respect to individual liability.
.7 Acts to be characterized by the Draft Code as "Crimes Under International
Law," 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 261, 263 (1950).
6i See, Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned
by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217 (1977).
Draft Code, supra note 62, art. 2(10), at 136.
" Id. at art. 2(12).
7 Parry, Some Considerations Upon the Context of a Draft Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 3 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 208, 211 (1950).
72 Id.




these bodies of law categorize murder and acts of violence, such as
occurred on board the Achille Lauro, as an international crime.
However, no provision of either the Nuremberg principles or the
Draft Code specifically authorizes nations to assert jurisdiction over
acts of international terrorism. Thus, in order to examine how ju-
risdiction may be asserted, international piracy law will be analyzed
in the next section.
C. The Seizure of the Vessel as an Act of Piracy
1. United States Practice
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to define and
punish acts of piracy.74 Under United States law the crime of piracy
is to be defined by the law of nations. 75 During the beginning of the
nineteenth century, United States courts characterized piracy as "de-
prediation of the seas ' 76 and "robbery and murder committed on
the high seas. ' ' 77 Pirates were considered "hostes humani generis"
and punishable in the tribunals of all nations.78 Traditionally, the
United States has pursued an active policy of apprehending pirates
and suppressing piracy, as a result of pirate attacks upon United
States merchant ships in the Mediterranean in the early 1800s.79 The
United States has justified this course of action by asserting that all
nations have the "equal and untramelled right to navigate on the
high seas." 80
2. Piracy Under the Law of Nations
Historically, international law defined piracy as "every unauthor-
ized act of violence by a private vessel on the open seas with the
7, U.S. CorNsr. art. 1, § 8 gives Congress the power to "define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law
of Nations."
75 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982), Piracy under law of Nations. "Whoever, on the
high seas,' commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is
afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life."Id.
7 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 155 (1820).
,7 1d. at 157 (citing § 8 of the 1790 Act of Congress, ch. 9, 3 Stat. 510). But
see United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 610 (1818) where Chief Justice
Marshall held that the crime of robbery is not piracy. See also United States v.
Chapels, 25 F. Cas. 399 (C.C.D. Va. 1819) (No. 14,782).
7K Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) at 153.
79 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 654 (1973).
W) United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380 (lth Cir. 1982), reh'g
denied, 685 F.2d 1389, cert. denied, Pauth-Arzuza v. United States, 459 U.S. 1114
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intent to plunder." 8' In addition, pirates have been categorized as
persons or ships at sea engaged in a professional manner in attacking
property and persons. 2 Some claim that every maritime state has
universal jurisdiction over pirates and may give chase and apprehend
pirates in the territorial sea of another nation. 3 States also are ob-
ligated to suppress piracy and assume jurisdiction over pirate ships.8 4
The real problem lies in determining whether, under international
law, a seizure of a vessel by persons on board a ship, such as the
Achille Lauro incident, constitutes an act of piracy allowing nations
to exercise universal jurisdiction over the offenders.
One interpretation of customary international law on piracy ex-
cludes seizures of ships by persons on board the ship as a piratical
act.85 Another view of international law suggests that unauthorized
acts of violence committed on the open sea by mutinous crew or
passengers against the vessel should be considered piratical.86 The
latter view, according to certain scholars, can apply to general criminal
(1982). See 33 U.S.C. § 381 (1982), which authorizes the President to use public
vessels to suppress piracy.
9' I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE 668 (H. Lauterpacht 8th
ed. 1955). See also Worthley, Pirate Non Mutat Dominium, 24 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 258 (1947).
.2 Genet, The Charge of Piracy in the Spanish Civil War, 32 AM. J. INT'L L.
253 (1938). The author provided these elements for a piratical act: (1) an act of
criminal violence; (2) an illegal attempt against goods or person; (3) a menace
directed against the security of general commerce; and (4) on the sea.
' ld. See also Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, supra note 17 at 35.
Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 263, 268 (1950).
85 Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 739, 810 (Supp. 1932). Article 3 provides:
Piracy is any of the following acts, committed in a place not within the
territorial jurisdiction of any state:
1. Any act of violence or of depredation committed with intent to rob,
rape, wound, enslave, imprison or kill a person or with intent to steal or
destroy property, for private ends without bona fide purpose of asserting
a claim of right, provided that the act is connected with an attack on or
from the sea or in or from the air. If the act is connected with an attack
which starts from on board ship, either that ship or another ship which is
involved must be a pirate ship or a ship without national character.
2. Any Act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with
knowledge of facts which make it a pirate ship.
3. Any act of instigation or of intentional facilitation of an act described
in paragraph I or paragraph 2 of this article.
Id. at 743. The comment to article 3 acknowledged that this article was the most
important one in the convention. Id. at 769. However, "single acts" of violence at
sea were not considered piratical, nor were mutiny or revolts aboard the ship. Id.
at 794. See also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (1979).M L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 81, at 609.
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acts on the high seas8 7 if the vessel has been commandeered or seized.88
As early as 1925, Professor Edwin Dickinson stated that hijackers
"are no less pirates than the pirates of old." 8 9 The anomalies and
disputes in the definition of piracy continued until 1937 when an
attempt was made to suppress piracy during the Spanish Civil War.9
France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom concluded the Nyon
Agreement, which stated that submarine attacks upon merchant ves-
sels are contrary to established rules of international law.9' Although
the Nyon Agreement did not propose to expand the legal concept of
piracy, 92 it did acknowledge that certain acts on the high seas are
"contrary to the most elementary dictates of humanity" and should
be treated as piratical. 93
3. The Convention on the High Seas
An attempt was made in 1958 by the United Nations to establish
a uniform concept of international piracy in the Convention on the
High Seas.94 Prior to the 1958 Convention, the International Law
Commission (ILC), guided largely by the Harvard Research in In-
ternational Law, 9 submitted a report to the General Assembly.9 The
ILC excluded "[a]cts committed on board a vessel by the crew or
passengers and directed against the vessel itself, or against the persons
or property on the vessel" as piracy. 7 Article 15 of the Convention
on the High Seas adopted the ILC's formulation in its basic form,
creating these requirements for an act of piracy: (1) an illegal act of
violence, detention or depredation; (2) for private ends; (3) on the high
87 Id. at 614.
,8 Id.
89 Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334, 358
n.82 (1925). Professor Dickinson suggested that hijackers should be treated as pirates
because they commit depredations along the routes of commerce, are a menace to
all nations, and such depredations may tend to become less discriminating.
9 See Genet, supra note 82.
91 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (Institute for Comparative
Public Law and International Law 1982).
92 Id. at 59.
93 Id. at 58.
9 Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 499 U.N.T.S. 31.
9 See supra note 83; M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBUC ORDER OF THE
OCEANS 809-10 (1962).
Report of the International Law Commission, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 20,
25 (1955) [hereinafter cited as the ILC Report].
97 Id. Commentary to article 14 of the ILC Report provided the same definition
as the Harvard Research. See supra note 8.
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seas; and (4) directed against another ship or aircraft. 9 In addition,
the Convention stated that if the act is committed on the high seas
or any other place outside the jurisdiction of a particular state, any
and all states are authorized to arrest and seize the pirates." The ra-
tionale for codifying the right of universal jurisdiction to all nations
is founded upon the high regard for the preservation of order on the
high seas. 00 The right to seize pirates and pirate ships may be carried
out only by warships or military aircraft.' 0' Although not defined in
the Convention, the "high seas" include any areas beyond the territorial
sea, which extend outward three miles from the coast. 0 All states are
obligated to cooperate to the fullest extent in repressing piracy on the
high seas. 03
4. Modern Piracy
The seizure of the Achille Lauro by Palestinian terrorists was
certainly an illegal act of violence that was committed on the high
seas. ° The two remaining elements for an act of piracy, "for private
ends" and "directed against another ship or aircraft," require further
clarification.
Although noted scholars have asserted that the Convention on the
High Seas adequately serves the goal of repressing piracy, 0 the rapid
increase in terrorist activities on the high seas brings into question
the practicality of the Convention's provisions on piracy. Indeed, the
98 Article 15 in full text provides:
Piracy consists at any of the following acts:(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship
or a private aircraft, and directed:
(a) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
person or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(b) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside
the jurisdiction of any State;(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
sub-paragraph I or sub-paragraph 2 of this article.
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 94.
Id. at art. 19.
IM M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 95, at 876.
,0, Convention on the High Seas, supra note 94, at art. 21.
102 United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980). See United States
v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147 (lth Cir. 1985).
103 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 94, at art. 14.
104 N.Y. Times, supra note 1.
105 M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 95, at 879.
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pirates of old were terrorists,c 6 yet terrorism is not specifically in-
cluded within the purview of the Convention.
A strikingly similar situation to the Achille Lauro seizure occurred
on January 22, 1961, when political foes of Portuguese Premier
Salazar seized the luxury liner Santa Maria in the Caribbean.107 The
group of captors took command of the ship killing one officer and
wounding several others during the course of the seizure.'0 The British
Admiralty and United States Navy dispatched ships, but Brazil even-
tually granted the captors asylum. '09 The Santa Maria incident caused
much debate over whether the persons who seized the vessel were
pirates or mere rebels."10 Although several experts doubted the charge
of piracy,"' the head of the United States Delegation to the Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea acknowledged that the victim state
could have made out a piracy claim. ' 2 Commentators that classified
the seizure of the Santa Maria as a rebel or insurgent act based their
conclusions on a variety of factors including: (1) the political nature
of the seizure," 3 (2) the private gain requirement,"' and (3) the fact
that no attack was made against another ship." 5 According to these
theories, politically motivated acts should not be considered "for
private gain." These acts, however, can be given the status of bel-
ligerent or insurgent acts according to the laws of war. ' 6 Venezuelan
revolutionaries received this treatment when they seized the German
ship Falke and attacked a Venezuelan port. 117
However, other commentators on the Santa Maria incident found
no justification in the law of insurgency for attacks against innocent
civilians." 8 Professor Franck has argued that even if the motives of
" G. MUELLER & F. ADLER, OUTLAWS OF THE OCEAN 160 (1985).
107 N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1961, at 1, col. 3.
IM Id.
IM N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1961, at 1, col. i.
III. Green, The Santa Maria: Rebels or Pirates, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 496 (1961).
II Id.; Vali, The Santa Maria Case, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 168 (1961); Van Zwa-
nengerg, Interference with Ships on the High Seas, 10 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 785
(1961).
12 Ambassador Authur H. Dean, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1961, at 1, col. 5.
"3 Vali, supra note I1, at 174.
'"4 Van Zwanenberg, supra note II1, at 804; McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra
note 95, at 821-22.
" Van Zwanenberg, supra note II1, at 804.
116 Id. at 806; Green, supra note 110, at 499. See Sundberg, Piracy and Terrorism,
in M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, supra note 30, at 461-65.
117 Green, supra note 110, at 502.
'" Fenwick, "Piracy" in the Caribbean, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 426-27, 429 (1961).
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the seizure were political, the attackers also sought some type of
personal gain." t9 According to Professor Franck, the ILC's recom-
mendations, which the General Assembly basically adopted, failed to
justify the limitation of piracy to external rather than internal acts. 20
During the drafting of the Convention, the Chinese unsuccessfully
proposed that internal acts aboard ships be included as piratical and
that universal jurisdiction be granted for internal acts.' 2 ' Under the
Convention of the High Seas, however, only the seized ship's flag
state can pursue the vessel if it is taken internally, whereas all nations
can pursue the vessel and its captors if taken externally. 2 2 Therefore,
the distinction between external and internal seizures is anomalous
at best, 23 and given modern terrorist seizures such as the Achille
Lauro and the accompanying violence, this distinction should be taken
out of the Convention.
Further criticism of the Convention on the High Seas may be found
when considering the past alleged "political piratical" acts,' 24 and
the possibility that these acts will be used increasingly in the future
with Articles 15 and 16. Although Article 15 of the Convention would
specifically exclude internal seizures of vessels as acts of piracy, Article
16 would accord pirate status to governmental ships seized internally
by a mutinous crew.' 25 This distinction appears unfounded. By ex-
cluding internal seizures from the definition of piracy, the Convention
appears to term seizures by crews of governmental ships piratical,
yet defines non-governmental seizures as non-piratical if they are for
"political ends.' ' 26 This rationale and the consistent United Nations
"1 Franck, To Define and Punish Piracies - The Lesson of the Santa Maria:
A Comment, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 839 (1961), reprinted in G. MUELLER & E. WISE,
supra note 43, at 218.
120 Id. at 219.
121 Regime of the High Seas, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 18 (1956).
122 Franck, supra note 119, at 221.
29 Id. at 220-22.
12, Acts of terrorism or political violence on the sea are increasing. On September
27, 1975, Filipino bandits hijacked a Japanese freighter. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1975,
at 1, col. 9. On August 27, 1979 Earl Mountbatten was assassinated by a bomb
explosion. See G. MUELLER & F. ADLER, supra note 106, at 157-77 and Nyhart,
Ocean Vessels and Offshore Structures, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TER-
RORISM (A. Evans & J. Murphy eds. 1978).
125 Article 16 provides: "The acts of piracy, as defined in article 15, committed
by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and
taken control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private
ship." Convention on the High Seas, supra note 94.
,26 Crockett, Toward a Revision of the International Law of Piracy, 26 DE PAUL
L. REV. 78, 87 (1976).
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trend to recognize the right of national liberation movements to
overthrow despotic governments are inappropriate when the violent
acts are directed against innocent citizens.'27 As one commentator
has suggested, the appropriate review of the political nature of a
seizure is to balance the need of political groups against the need
for freedom and security of the high seas.' 28 Certainly, personal
security of life and property far outweigh the need for radical groups
to prey upon the innocent.
Another problem with the Convention arises when considering the
developments of the Law of the Sea Treaty. As commentators have
noted, the geographical area of the high seas may be diminishing as
a result of this Treaty.'2 9 Should the territorial sea be extended and
the high seas narrowed, territorial states will have a wider area of
exclusive jurisdiction,'30 along with the discretion not to prosecute
potential pirate/hijackers. This fact, accompanied by incidents such
as the Santa Maria'3' which are technically not covered by the Con-
vention, could create a situation where attacks on vessels would go
unpunished. Clearly, what is needed in the future is a provision
defining piracy which includes all internal seizures of vessels irrespective
of the place of the seizure and of the political nature of the seizure.'3 2
Suggestions have been made for the creation of an international
criminal body to define and develop sanctions against acts of piracy,'
but what is immediately needed is the authorization by nations to
pursue pirates/hijackers universally as international criminals. 34 The
anomalies in defining international sea piracy must be clarified to
avoid situations where hijackers of vessels may go unpunished. States
must be authorized to protect themselves and their citizens from
offenses committed on the high seas.
27 Id. at 92.
12 Id. at 99.
'29 Dubner, The Law of International Sea Piracy, I I N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
471, 479 (1979).
' 3 Id. at 477.
" See id. at 482, where the author refers to the Guatamalan/Mexican incident
of 1958, where Guatamala launched rocket attacks against Mexican fishing boats
claiming they were pirates. See also McDowell, Contemporary Practice of the United
States, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 861, 875 (1975), where the author discusses the Cambodian
seizure of the U.S. merchant vessel Mayaguez.
1.2 Dubner, supra note 129, at 487-90.
"' Id. at 491-93.
'3 See Note, International Law: Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime: Uni-
versality Principle: War Crimes: Crimes Against Humanity: Piracy: Israel's Nazis
and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 326 (1961).
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D. Terrorism as an International Crime
1. United Nations Efforts
As seen in the section on piracy, inconsistencies in international
legislation may contribute to jurisdictional problems. Similar incon-
sistencies are found in the law of terrorism.
Prior to the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, efforts
were made by the League of Nations to codify principles regarding
terrorism; however, the League was unable to achieve worldwide
acceptance of these principles. 135 After the United Nations came into
being, conventions were established dealing with the protection of
civilian persons in time of war, 3 6 aircraft hijacking, 37 internationally
protected persons including diplomats, 3 " and hostage taking.3 9 These
conventions created general prohibitions against certain classes of
acts. Some commentators have suggested that international terrorism
is proscribed by jus cogens.'14 It is unlikely, however, that these
conventions apply to all acts of terrorism. ' 4' Even today, with frequent
terrorist attacks against innocent persons, the world community can-
not agree on a method or means for controlling international ter-
rorism. 42 In the United States, courts have not recognized that terrorism
is considered a clear violation of the law of nations,' 3 although this
13 (League of Nations) Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Ter-
rorism, opened for signature Nov. 16, 1937 (not entered into force), 7 INTERNATIONAl.
LEGISLATION 862 (M. Hudson ed. 1941), 862 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 23 (1938),
A. GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL AsYLuM 119 (1980). India ratified the treaty and
23 other states signed but never ratified.
136 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
13 Tokyo Convention, supra note 36.
'3 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Interna-
tionally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, done Dec. 14, 1973, 28
U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532 (entered into force Feb. 20, 1977).
1' International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, done Dec. 17, 1979
(not yet in force), G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. Doc. A/34/819 (1979) [hereinafter referred
to as Hostage Taking Convention]. This Convention is printed in 74 AM. J. INT'L
L. 277 (1980).
140 Whiteman, Jus Cogens in International Law, With a Projected List, 7 GA.
J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 609, 625 (1977). See also McWhinney, "International Terrorism"
United Nations Projects for Legal Controls in Terrorism: An International Journal,
Vol. 7, 1984-85, at 175.
14 For example, the 1973 U.N. Convention applies only to diplomatic personnel
(Article 2), and the hijacking conventions apply only with respect to acts on board
aircraft. See Montreal Convention, supra note 36.
142 Murphy, Legal Controls and Deterrence of Terrorism: Performance and Pros-
pects, 13 RUT. L.J. 465 (1982); Friedlander, The Enforcement of International
Criminal Law: Fact or Fiction, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 79 (1985).
14 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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position has been severely criticized.'" These conventions do, however,
demonstrate a general acceptance of principles that the world com-
munity seeks to promulgate: the protection of human life, liberty,
and property.' 45 Another problem that the United Nations has faced
in developing a clear code prohibiting terrorism is the problem of
defining terrorism' 6 in a manner which does not conflict with the
interests of Third World nations.'47 Third World countries have argued
consistently that violent acts of legitimate national liberation move-
ments should not be considered terroristic.' 41
The 1979 United Nations Hostage Convention represents the broad-
est effort to date in defining terroristic acts and jurisdictional rights.
Created after the Entebbe incident in 1976, the Convention generally
requires international cooperation in preventing, prosecuting, and
punishing international hostage taking incidents. 49 The Convention
also extends the applicable convention on the laws of war to inter-
national acts of hostage taking. 110 Clearly, hostage taking is considered
an international offense. 5 ' The seizure or detention of hostages,'52
I" See D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers?, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92
(1985).
"4 McWhinney, supra note 79, at 1978-79; see also Bassiouni, The Proscribing
Function of International Criminal Law in the Processes of International Protection
of Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 193 (1981).
" 3 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM, DOCUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL
CONTROL 1 (1981).
" Murphy, "The United Nations and International Terrorism" in Terrorism:
An International Journal, Vol. 7, 1984-85, at 603.
1 Id. at 603, 607.
1 Id. at 607.
ISO Id.; see supra note 73; Boyle, "The Entebbe Hostage Crises" in Terrorism:
Political Violence and International Crime 562 (Hwakhan ed. 1984). Professor Boyle
notes that if the taking of civilian hostages is prohibited during wartime under article
34 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, [6 U.S.T. 3516, 3540, T.I.A.S. No. 3365],
the same provision should logically extend to peacetime hostage takings.
Hostage Taking Convention article I provides:
1. Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or
to continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hos-
tage") in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international
intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group
of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or-implicit
condition for the release of the hostage commits the offense of taking of
hostages ('hostage taking') within the meaning of this Convention.
2. Any person who:(a) attempts to commit an act of hostage taking, or(b) participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts
to commit an act of hostage taking likewise commits an offense for the
purposes of this Convention.
1" Id. at art. 1.
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and threats to kill,'53 injure or to continue to detain them'54 in order
to compel a third party to behave in a certain way,'" also are
prohibited. 5 6 Those who act as accomplices or participants in any
part of the hostage taking are as responsible as the actual takers. 57
All parties to the Convention may exercise jurisdiction over the
offense" under the classical theories of international jurisdiction. 5 9
Commentators on the Hostage Convention have construed the pro-
vision "each state party shall take such measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over any offense in Article I" as meaning
that states must enact legislation making hostage taking an offense,
and further the Convention purposes by pursuing offenders. 60 The
United States has enacted legislation concerning hostages' 6' and ter-




15 Id. See also Shubber, The International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 205, 209 (1982).
" Hostage Taking Convention, supra note 139, at art. 1(2).
15 Id. at art. 5 provides:
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over any of the offenses set forth in article I which
are committed:
(a) in its territory or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that
State;
(b) by any of its nationals or, if that State considers it appropriate,
by those stateless persons who have their habitual residence in its territory;
(c) in order to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any
act; or
(d) with respect to a hostage who is a national of that State, if that
State considers it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in article I in cases
where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite
him to any of the States mentioned in paragraph I of this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude criminal jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with internal law.
,' See supra note 13, at art. 5.
, Shubber, supra note 156, at 220.
161 Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking, 98
Stat. 2186 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. 1I 1984)) provides:
[Wlhoever, whether inside or outside the United States, seizes or detains
and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in
order to compel a third person or a governmental organization to do or
abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the
release of the person detained, or attempts to do so, shall be punished by
imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
1Z Act of Nov. 14, 1983, 97 Stat. 972 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa (Supp. If
1984)) (Antiterrorism Assistance Program).
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take all practicable measures to prevent taking of hostages"' 63 and
to exchange information on terrorist activities.M
2. Other Modern Efforts
Modern developments including recent United Nations efforts, 65
regional conventions,'6 and works of independent world jurists, 67
point toward the concept of state responsibility in the law of terrorism.
As noted in the piracy and international criminal law sections of the
Convention on the High Seas,16 states have a general duty in certain
circumstances to act with due diligence to prevent the commission
of acts of international terrorism within their jurisdictions.' 69 Due
diligence includes the duty to apprehend,' 70 prosecute,'7' punish,'72 or
extradite.' 7 Under the ILC's 1984 Convention, a breach of any of
the rules regarding apprehension or extradition, including the re-
163 Article 4 provides:
States' Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the offenses set forth
in Article 1, particularly by:
(a) taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their re-
spective territories for the commission of those offenses within or outside
their territories, including measures to prohibit in their territories illegal
activities of persons, groups and organizations that encourage, instigate,
organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of taking of hostages;
(b) exchanging information and coordinating the taking of administrative
and other measures as appropriate to prevent the commission of those
offenses.
Id. at art. 4(b).
16 On December 10, 1985, the General Assembly adopted a resolution unani-
mously declaring all acts of terrorism as criminal. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1985, at
A4, col. 3.
" Organization of American States Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts
of Terrorist Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that
are of International Significance, done Feb. 2, 1971, 21 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No.
8413, 10 I.L.M. 255; European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened
for signature Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90, 16 I.L.M. 1272 (1976), U.K.T.S.
No. 93 (1978), Cmrd. 7390.
1.7 See, International Law Association Paris Conference (1984), reprinted in Ter-
rorism: An International Journal, Vol. 7, (1984-85 Evans Ed.) at 199.
I" See supra notes 68, 103 and accompanying text.
16 Article 9 I.L.A. 1984 Convention; Lillich & Paxman, supra note 68, at 222-
35.
'" Lillich & Paxman, supra note 68, at 284; 7 J.B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1059 (1906); Texas Cattle Claims, 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 749 (1967); Janes Case (United States v. Mexico), 4 R. Int'l
Arb. Awds. 82 (1927); Neer Case (United States v. Mexico), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awds.
60 (1926).
171 Lillich & Paxman, supra note 68, at 287.
172 Id. at 294.
"' Id. at 300.
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quirement to exercise due diligence in pursuing terrorists, "entails
state responsibility."' 74 According to the International Law Associ-
ation, "mere statements of rules with no provisions for who is
responsible to enforce them would be an empty gesture.' 7
The United States had the authority to assert jurisdiction over the
Achille Lauro terrorists under the theory of general international
criminal law, the law of terrorism, or arguably, the law of piracy.
Once a state has established a valid jurisdictional base, the exercise
of that jurisdiction must be in accordance with international law.
The remaining section discusses the rights of third party states to
exercise jurisdiction by forcible means when other nations fail to
enforce customary norms of international law. While Egypt's reasons
for relinquishing jurisdiction and failing to prosecute the terrorists
involved in the Achille Lauro case were basically politically motivated,
the failure to exercise rights granted under international law tends
to weaken the effect of such accepted standards of law.
III. CLAIMS TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION By FORCE
A. Current United States Policy
In an effort to combat international terrorism, the Reagan Admin-
istration has responded by developing measures to prevent terrorist
attacks, planning measures to effectively react to terrorist incidents,
and seeking an international consensus against terrorism.'" 6 In addi-
tion to creating new legislation with respect to terrorism,' United
States policy strives to bring the perpetrators of these crimes to
justice. 178
In the past United States courts have held that the concept of male
captus bene detentus'79 is an acceptable method of asserting criminal
jurisdiction over individuals, provided those individuals are entitled
to a fair trial.'80 Although the noted Ker/Frisbie rationale has been
"" See supra note 167, at art. 13.
175 See supra note 167, at 206 (explanation to art. 13).
"7 Almond, "Limits and Possibilities of International Regulations of Terrorism"
in Terrorism: An International Journal, Vol. 7 (1984-85 Evans ed.) at 498.
' See supra notes 161, 162.
' Ambassador Robert M. Sayre, "Combatting Terrorism: American Policy and
Organization" (Address Before the Third International Civil Aviation Security Con-
ference, Washington D.C., July 21, 1982), in Terrorism: An International Journal,
Vol. 7, (1984-84 Evans ed.) at 482.
"7 Badly captured, well detained.
IM) Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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weakened domestically,'"' United States courts have permitted seizures
of criminals abroad when achieved without protests from the state
where the abduction occurs.'82 The current United States trend has
been to increase enforcement jurisdiction in certain areas. 83 While
the exercise of force to obtain criminals located in other nations has
been criticized, 84 the United States, along with other nations, has
established such a trend."8 " The United States response stems from
the past failures of international treaties on terrorism and their pro-
visions on enforcement.'8 6 This response represents a current trend
which must be analyzed under international law in the world com-
munity context. The following sections discuss the use of force in
international law, possible justifications for United States interven-
tion, and the future prospects for such actions.
B. The Restrictions on the Use of Force Under International Law
The United Nations Charter requires the settlement of disputes by
peaceful means' s7 and abstention from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. 8
Created at the end of the Second World War, the Charter's basic
aim was to reduce international armed conflict. 8 9 Article 2(4) was
1,1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
which developed the judicially imposed exclusionary rule, attempting to deter illegal
police conduct.
'$2 United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975). But see
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), reh'g den. 504 F.2d 1380,
on remand 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Comment, United States
v. Toscanino: An Assault on the Ker-Frisbie Rule, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 865 (1975).
'9 Zagaris and Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 317, where the authors note the
increased enforcement jurisdiction in the interdiction of vessels carrying illegal aliens
and narcotics on the high seas.
194 See supra note 37. See Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State Over
Fugitives Brought From a Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative
Study, 32 IND. L.J. 427 (1957).
'N, See Note, supra note 17, at 1087.
IN. See Rubin, "Current Legal Approaches to International Terrorism" in Ter-
rorism: An International Journal, Vol. 7, (1984-85 Evans ed.) at 151.
'"' U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3 provides in full: "All members shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security, and justice, are not endangered."
'8$ U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 provides: "All members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."
1.9 Comment, Controlling International Terrorism: An Analysis of Unilateral
Force and Proposals for Multilateral Cooperation, 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 209, 217
(1976).
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designed specifically to ensure that international peace and security
would be maintained, and that war would not be used as a means
for conducting foreign policy.'19 Article 2(4) must be construed in
light of Article 1 of the Charter which provides that the first purpose
of the organization is "the maintenance of international peace and
security by taking of effective collective measures to prevent or remove
threats to the peace and to suppress acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace."' 9' Commentators present at the framing of
the Charter seem to suggest that certain uses of force may be jus-
tified. ' 92
One question which has arisen with respect to the construction of
Article 2(4) is whether the requirement that the "territorial integrity"
of a state be respected is satisfied as long as no territory is actually
taken from the state. 93 Another question under Article 2(4) is whether
the "political independence" of a state is violated if it is driven by
the threat of force to take action that it would not normally un-
dertake. ,94 The General Assembly attempted to clarify these issues in
the Definition of Aggression,'95 the Declaration of Principles of Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States,'96 and
the Essentials of Peace Resolution.' 9 The Definition of Aggression
concluded that "the attack by armed forces of a state in the territory
of another state, or any military occupation, however temporary in
such territory, is considered aggression.' 98 The first use of force by
a state in contravention of the Charter constitutes primafacie evidence
of aggression.' 99 Naturally, the key phrase in determining aggression
1W) L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY
AND DOCUMENTS 102-07 (2d and rev. ed. 1949).
1' Id. at 45.
192 Id.
1' Id. at 51; HENKIN, supra note 26, at 140 See Henkin, Force, Intervention
and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L LAW 177
(1963).
I- L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, supra note 190, at 51.
19- U.N. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 31, 142 U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) reprinted in FERENCZ, DEFINING INTER-
NATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE (1975) at 14, 15.
1' Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
1' Essentials of Peace Resolution, G.A.Res. 290 (IV), 4 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
13), U.N. Doc. A/1159 (1949).
'" Definition of Aggression, supra note 195, at art. 3(a).
Id. at art. 2.
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is "in contravention of the Charter." In determining whether an act
violates Article 2(4), other provisions of the Charter must be reviewed,
as well as doctrines emanating from these provisions.
C. Exceptions to the General Prohibition of the Use of Force
Professor Brownlie has categorized the general exceptions to the
prohibition of the use of force as individual self-defense, collective
self-defense, actions authorized by a competent international organ
or a treaty provision, actions to terminate trespass, and necessity
arising from natural catastrophe. 200 Also considered an exception to
the prohibition of the use of force is the doctrine of protection of
nationals abroad.201 Others scholars have contended, however, that
in addition to the general right of self-defense, only two other uses
of force are permissible under international law: actions taken by the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, and enforcement
actions by regional arrangements or agencies under Article 53 with
the authorization of the Security Council.20 2 In determining the per-
missible uses of force for self-defense, the construction of Article 51
is critical. Article 51 provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and se-
curity. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of
self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at anytime
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain and restore
international peace and security.
1. The Right of Self-Defense
Divergent views exist concerning the meaning of the phrase "armed
attack" in Article 51 in relation to the doctrine of anticipatory self-
2,11 1. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 432
(1963).
2,, Id. at 433. See also infra notes 217, 233, 234.
202 Nanda, The United States Armed Intervention in Grenada-Impact on World
Order, 14 CAL. W. lr'L L.J. 395, 417 (1984). U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. I
provides: "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional ar-
rangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforce-
ment action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies
without the authorization of the Security Council. .. ."
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defense.203 One view is that anticipatory self-defense is contrary to
Article 51 because it involves the use of armed force in the absence
of a prior armed attack. 2° 4 Another view permits anticipatory self-
defense subject to certain requirements, 15 including the exhaustion
of peaceful remedies, 20 6 necessity, 20 7 and proportionality. 20 8 In the
broadest sense, the use of force by the United States to divert the
Egyptian jet was an act of anticipatory self-defense. As stated by
former United Nations Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick:
Itihe prohibitions against the use of force in the United Nations
Charter are contextual, not absolute. They provide ample justifi-
cation for the use of force against force in pursuit of the other
values also inscribed in the Charter-freedom, democracy, peace.
The Charter does not require that people submit supinely to terror,
nor that their neighbors be indifferent to their terrorization. 209
The values that the United States seeks to defend by the forcible
exercise of jurisdiction include the protection of its nationals, prop-
erty, and security both abroad and at home. 210 Additionally, terrorism
can be considered a type of warfare involving indiscriminate attacks
upon innocent persons. Although the terrorists did not commit an
"armed attack" while aboard the jet, there arguably existed an "im-
101 Anticipatory self-defense, commonly referred to as preventive war, or preemp-
tory self-defense, attempts to eliminate a source of a threat or attack before it
actually occurs. McDOUGAL & FELiCLANO, supra note 26, at 231-32.
W4 HENKIN, supra note 26, at 232-33; P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS
165-68 (1968); 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 200, at 275-78; Kunz, Individual and Col-
lective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J.
INT'L L. 872, 876-78 (1947).
205 The broader view of anticipatory self-defense is supported by McDOUGAL &
FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 233-36; McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and
Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 599 (1963); D. BowETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-88 (1958); Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force
by Individual States in International Law, 81 Hague Recueil des Cours 455, 459-98
(1952); Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine - Interdiction: National
and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 335, 347-53 (1962).
20 Mallison and Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the
Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
417, 427 (1982).
207 Id. at 429; Note, Attack on Osirak: Delimitation of Self-Defense Under
International Law, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 131, 135 (1982).
2" G. SCHWARZENBERGER, I.L.A. SECOND REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
21w Nanda, supra note 202, at 418.
210 Grimaldi & Joyner, The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the
Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 621, 651 (1985).
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minent threat" to the security of United States citizens abroad in
two respects: (1) had the terrorists been permitted to go free, they
could have returned to disturb world order, and (2) future terrorists
would believe inaction by victim states constitutes a sanction to
continue in crime."1 ' Indeed, the United States could ill afford to
deliberate on the future treatment of the Achille Lauro terrorists. If
the United States had not acted quickly, the terrorists may have
returned to the PLO and escaped any punishment for their acts.
Therefore, the United States actions fulfilled the classic imminency
requirement. 2 2 Furthermore, it cannot be said that the United States
has failed to seek peaceful resolutions to the question of terrorism, 23
nor that the interception of the jet was disproportionate to the threat
imposed. 2 4 To further evaluate the United States actions from a self-
defense perspective, especially in light of Egypt's involvement, two
other doctrines of international law must be examined: intervention
and self-help.
2. The Doctrines of Intervention and Self-Help
a. Intervention
Intervention, in the broadest sense, has been characterized as "an
act of interference by one state with the internal or external affairs
of another state in order to induce a certain behavior of the latter,
whereby the intervening state employs coercion and violates the sov-
ereign will of its victim." 2 ' Professor Henkin calls intervention "the
military interaction by other nations in the internal struggles of other
211 Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 Hague
Recueil des Cours 195, 334 (1955); Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32
AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
2,2 The Caroline case is frequently referred to as the locus classicus of the law
of anticipatory self-defense. Britain destroyed a United States vessel en route to
providing supplies to Canadian insurgents, after British protests over the supply
route were ignored. Secretary of State Daniel Webster formulated the test of "instant,
overwhelming, leaving no moment for deliberation" as the requirement for antici-
patory self-defense. J.B. MOORE, supra note 170, at 409-14. Letter from D. Webster
to Fox, 29 British and Foreign State Papers, 1129, 1138 (1840-41).
213 The United States has been present and party to the Convention on Terrorism.
For examples of Conventions relating to terrorism to which the United States is
party, see supra notes 94, 135-39 and accompanying text.
2", See Grimaldi & Joyner, supra note 210, at 657 (force must be proportionate
to danger).
21' Opperman, Intervention, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 233
(R. Bernhardt ed. 1982).
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nations. ' ' 216 Other writers have viewed intervention as the use of force
by one state against another to induce respect of the enforcing state's
rights under international law. 217 The general norm in international
law, however, requires nations to refrain from intervention in the
internal affairs of other nations. 2  This norm arises from the concepts
of sovereignty and peaceful coexistence. 219 Every state should theo-
retically have the capacity to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its
own territory without interference from another state. 2°0 The United
States interception of the jet was indeed a military intervention into
Egypt's affairs and conforms to recent United States practice. 221
Although intervention is considered to be prohibited in international
law where states are derelict in their responsibilities to protect persons
within their own borders, other states have been permitted to intervene
on behalf of these persons. 22 Therefore, the doctrines of intervention
and self-help 223 have been viewed as classic exceptions to the general
prohibition of the use of force.
b. Self-Help
The doctrine of self-help involves "the unilateral protection and
216 HENKIN, supra note 26, at 153.
217 Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L.
REV. 325, 331 (1967).
2 Schroder, Non-Intervention, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
358 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1982).
219 Id.
220 See, e.g., Novogrod, Indirect Aggression, in BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note
30, at vol. I, 213.
221 For example, the United States has intervened in Grenada, El Salvador, and
the Middle East. However, each act of intervention must be analyzed separately
according to the situation. See Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada: Re-
flections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984); Doner, The
United States Invasion of Grenada: Resurrection for the Johnson Doctrine, 20 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 173 (1984); Nanda, supra note 202.
222 Lillich, supra note 217, at 329, 333. Professor Lillich cites article 2(7) of the
U.N. Charter for the proposition that if the United Nations may intervene in a
crisis situation, the doctrine of intervention is not dead. Id. at 338.
223 See Schroder, supra note 218, at 358; Moore, Legal Standards for Intervention
in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 191 (1983); Matheson, Practical
Considerations for the Development of Legal Standards for Intervention, 13 GA. J.
Ihr'L & Comp. L. 205 (1983). Another doctrine under international law, humanitarian
intervention, also is considered an exception to the prohibitions of the use of force.
See generally Franck and Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian
Intervention By Military Force, 67 Am. J. INT'L L. 275 (1973); Comment, Human-
itarian Intervention, Nationality and the Rights of Refugees-Operation Moses: The
Israeli Airlift of Ethiopian Jews, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 585 (1985); Hassan, Realpolitik
in International Law: After Tanzanian- Ugandan Conflict "Humanitarian Interven-
tion" Reexamined, 17 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 859 (1981).
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enforcement of rights" 224 by force and tends to take on a remedial
character. 225 Self-help should be "reserved to reactions against vio-
lations of a State's rights that do not occur in the form of an armed
attack. ' 226 The doctrine of self-help, of which intervention is a part,
is not without its critics. 7 In 1949, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) rejected the United Kingdom's argument in the Corfu Channel
case that "Operation Retail," a minesweeping operation in Albanian
territorial waters, was needed for self-preservation or self-help. 228 The
court held that it can regard the alleged right of intervention only
as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has in the past
given rise to most serious abuses. 229
Scholars have construed the Corfu Channel case as holding that
only those self-help measures which are "manifestations of a policy
of force" are illegal, and not as a general prohibition against self-
help measures. 2" The ICJ's decision reflected the concern over po-
tential abuses of force by nations under the guise of "self-help."
Therefore, in order to be legitimate, self-help measures must be subject
to review by the international community as a whole231 and must be
evaluated in terms of world community interests. 232 Relevant to this
inquiry are two examples of self-help actions: (1) the customary right
of nations to protect their nationals, and (2) recent hostage rescue
operations.
c. The Protection of Nationals Abroad
The right of nations to protect their nationals abroad was a cus-
tomary international right before the creation of the Charter. 23 In
the Spanish Moroccan Claims Arbitration, the arbitrator stated, "it
cannot be denied that at a certain point the interest of a State in
exercising protection over its nationals and their property can take
22, Bryde, Self-Help, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 215 (R.
Bernhardt ed. 1982).
225 D. BOWETT, supra note 205, at 11.
21, Bryde, supra note 224, at 215.
-' See e.g., McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 137, 207-17; 1. BROWNLIE,
supra note 200, at 255.
22' Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J.S.
229 Id. at 35.
2.10 D. BOWETT, supra note 205, at 15.
231 HENKIN, supra note 26, at 164; Schwenninger, The 1980s: New Doctrines of
Intervention or New Norms of Nonintervention, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 427-32
(1981).
232 Schwenninger, supra note 231, at 428.
233 D. BOWETT, supra note 205, at 87.
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precedence over territorial sovereignty, despite the absence of any
convention provisions. ' 234 Jurists have recognized that the protection
of nationals abroad can be equated with the preservation and pro-
tection of the state itself.23" States which intervene in other states'
affairs on behalf of nationals do so because the non-protecting state
does not afford necessary protection. 236 Normally, states may intervene
on behalf of their nationals only where no other means of redress
are available. 237 The intervention must be considered a necessity,
similar to the requirements of anticipatory self-defense. 231 In the past
the United States has assumed criminal jurisdiction over aliens com-
mitting offenses against United States citizens abroad, especially where
other countries do not apprehend or prosecute those offenders.
239
States which utilize force to protect nationals because of a breach
of an obligation by a non-protecting state are justified if the non-
protecting state does not conform to a standard of "due diligence." ' 240
Due diligence requires that all measures reasonable under the cir-
cumstances be taken to protect the nationals of another state. 24' The
due diligence requirement must be analyzed on a case by case basis.
242
In early Twentieth Century arbitration cases, states were held liable
for the failure to apprehend, punish, and extradite terrorists or crim-
inals, depending upon the reasonableness of the states' criminal pro-
cesses.2 3 A state's failure to exercise due diligence in apprehending and
prosecuting criminals within its jurisdiction, however, does not au-
tomatically give other states the right to intervene, especially in the
post-Charter era.
d. An Analogy to Hostage Rescue Attempts
Much discussion has arisen concerning the legality of hostage rescue
attempts. 244 Such attempts are uses of force by states invoking the
234 Anglo-Spanish Arbitrations, Beni-Madan, Rzini Claim, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. (1925)
at 616.
233 Lillich, supra note 217, at 336; D. BOWETT, supra note 205, at 91.
236 P. JESSUP, supra note 204, at 169; L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 81, at 309;
Waldock, supra note 205, at 455.
237 D. BOWETT, supra note 205, at 88.
238 RODICK, THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928), at 32.
239 Id. at 35.
2W( D. BOWETT, supra note 205, at 89; Lillich & Paxman, supra note 68, at 260,
276-79.
241 Lillich & Paxman, supra note 68, at 246.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 254-60, 276-305.
244 See e.g., Jefferey, The American Hostages in Tehran: The I.C.J. and the
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customary right to protect nationals. In addition to the "due dili-
gence" standard discussed above, however, several other customary
elements must be present to justify state action in protecting its
nationals abroad.2 45 There must be "an imminent threat of injury to
the nationals," and the measure of protection must be "strictly
confined to the object of protecting them." 246 The latter requirement
is derived from the Article 2(4) prohibition against the impairment
of another nation's territorial integrity or political independence.2 47
In the past ten years, more than ten rescue raids have been
undertaken248 with the majority resulting in successful rescues. 249 The
number of rescue attempts, however, pales in comparison to the number
of terrorist attacks occurring within the last two decades. For example,
since 1968 terrorists have committed over 200 criminal attacks. Sev-
enty-two of these attacks have been aimed at United States citizens
in foreign countries. Thus, over thirty percent of all terrorist attacks
since 1968 have involved United States victims.
2 0
One of the most successful and controversial rescue attempts was
the Israeli raid at Entebbe Airport in 1976. 211 Israeli commandoes
Legality of Rescue Missions, 30 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 717 (1981); Note, Resort to
Force by States to Protect Nationals: The United States Rescue Mission to Iran and
its Legality Under International Law, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 485 (1981).
245 Grimaldi & Joyner, supra note 210, at 651-53.
24 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 200, at 299; Grimaldi & Joyner, supra note 210, at
651-53; D. BoWErT, supra note 205, at 95-97; Lillich, supra note 217, at 337.
See Comment, The United States Action in Grenada: An Exercise in Realpolitik,
16 U. MIAMI. INT. AM. L. REV. 53, 96 (1985); see also Suzuki, A State's Provisional
Competence to Protect Human Rights In a Foreign State, 15 TEX. INT'L L.J. 231
(1980); Note, supra note 244; Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention
and Self-Defense, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 38, 49 (J. Moore
ed. 1974); Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L.J. 774,
800 (1976); Finch, Pueblo and Mayaguez: A Legal Analysis, 9 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 79 (1977).
247 See generally THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965 (J. Carey ed. 1967).
24S See supra note 8, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1985, at A10, col. I. The following
rescue attempts have been undertaken: July 3, 1976 Israeli raid at Entebbe Airport;
June 13, 1977 rescue of school teachers from the South Moluccans; October 18,
1977 commando rescue of hijacked Lufthansa plane; February 19, 1978 killing of
Egyptian commandos in Cyprus; April 24, 1980 unsuccessful attempt to free hostages
in Iran; May 5, 1980 storming of the Iranian Embassy in London; January 28, 1982
rescue of kidnapped Brig. General James L. Dozier; November 7, 1985 raid against
Colombian rebels; and the most recent and tragic of rescue attempts, the November
24, 1985 Egyptian commando raid in Malta to rescue passengers hijacked on an
Egyptian airliner. Id.
249 N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1985, at Al, cols. 5,6.
2.50 Supra note 248.
251 See generally Boyle, International Law in Time of Crisis: From the Entebbe
Raid to the Hostage Convention, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 769 (1980); Knisbacher, The
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rescued 103 passengers and crew members, although a number of
persons, including hostages, were killed. 2 2 Various commentators
acknowledged Uganda's responsibility to take jurisdiction over the
hijackers and hostages. 23 The United Nations Security Council later
failed to condemn the Israeli action. 25 4 According to several scholars,
this decision implies that international law was not violated 255 because
force was not used against the "territorial integrity" or "political
independence" of Uganda. 1
6
On April 24, 1980, the United States launched "operation Blue
Light," which involved transport planes and helicopters attempting
to rescue the hostages held in the United States Embassy in Tehran.211
The plan was aborted after the tragic deaths of United States serv-
icemen in a mid-air collision.5 " In the subsequent Case Concerning
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 259 the In-
ternational Court of Justice did not specifically rule on the legality
of rescue operations. 260 The legality of such operations still remains
unsettled in international law.2 6'
In the Achille Lauro incident, the United States acted consistently
with the doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad by intervening on
behalf of those United States citizens who were victims of the terrorist
attack. Egypt failed to take jurisdiction, prosecute, or extradite the
offenders despite requests from the United States. 262 Egypt validly
could have held the offenders under the Hostage Convention and
arguably under the international law of piracy..
Entebbe Operation: A Legal Analysis of Israel's Rescue Action, 12 J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 57 (1977); Note, Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad: The
Entebbe Incident, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 117 (1977).
252 Id.
25 Boyle, The Entebbe Hostage Crisis in Hwakhan, supra note 150, at 562. See
supra note 251. See also Sheehan, The Entebbe Raid: The Principle of Self-Help
in International Law as Justification for States Use of Armed Force, FLETCHER
FORUM 135 (1977).
2S4 31 U.N. SCOR (1941st mtg.) 41-53, U.N. Doc. s/pu 1941 (prov. Ed.) (1976).
25 Boyle, supra note 253, at 576.
256 HENKIN, supra note 26, at 145.
257 See supra note 248.
25M Id.
21 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consulor Staff in Tehran (United
States v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 17, at 1 32.
260 Id.
261 Jefferey, supra note 244, at 722-23; Note, supra note 244, at 517. See LILLICH,
THE I.C.J.'s DECISION AND OTHER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES IN THE IRAN
CRISIS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 25-32 (R. Steele ed. 1981). Professor Lillich's remarks
on page 32 indicate that the case of the proponents of the doctrine of rescue operations
262 NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 1985, at 31.
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Egypt's decision to release the offenders to the PLO was a political
one, perhaps motivated by fear of alienating Arab neighbors or
instigating reprisals. Whatever the reasons given by Egypt, the key
factor in evaluating the United States action is Article 2(4). It cannot
be said that the United States violated Egypt's "territorial integrity"
or "political independence" by intercepting the jet. At best, Egypt's
jet was incovenienced for a few hours.
The interception served as a positive reinforcement of the prohi-
bition against terrorism. This action was motivated by the rationale
of deterrence and sought to protect United States citizens abroad. In
addition, the interception was strictly confined to the purpose of
bringing the offenders to justice. This precision-timed maneuver de-
serves much praise. This action by the United States, however, raises
many international law issues which need future clarification. The
remaining section discusses several proposals.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Clearly, international criminal law provides that individuals who
commit international crimes are responsible for their acts. In the
Achille Lauro incident, the four hijackers and their leader were subject
to United States jurisdiction under various theories: the passive per-
sonality principle, the universality principle, the law of hostages, the
law of terrorism, and arguably, international sea piracy. With respect
to piracy, future efforts should be made to incorporate seizures of
ships on the high seas into codified law. Such seizures, when taking
place on board ships, should be defined as acts of piracy. In order
to prevent these types of piratical acts in the future, every nation
must have the freedom to pursue and apprehend such criminals.
Conflicts in international jurisdiction and the resulting discrepancies
must be clarified in the future to establish guidelines with respect to
the right to pursue offenders. The United States interception of the
Egyptian jet clearly was justified under classical theories of state
responsibility, self-defense, self-help, the protection of nationals abroad
and hostage rescue operations. Article 2(4) was not violated to the
extent Egypt claimed, and such rescue actions undoubtedly will be
repeated.
In evaluating future uses of force against terrorism, several points
must be made. The rights of the hostages are at stake in any such
situation.2 63 Before any action can be taken, the military feasibility
263 See Cooper, Hostage Rights: Law and Practice in Throes of Evolution, 15
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 61 (1983).
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of the operation must be evaluated carefully. The ultimate goal is
the preservation of life. The United States response to the Achille
Lauro incident was executed only after the hostages were secure
in Egypt. In contrast, Egypt recently launched a commando raid
in Malta on November 25, 1985, in which only twenty to thirty
passengers were rescued, while the rest were killed. 26
The author is not criticizing the Egyptian effort to rescue the
hostages, but its timeliness does raise questions. It must be realized,
however, that decisions to utilize force usually must be made in
urgent circumstances when the time for decision-making is short.
Nations must therefore seek to establish functional hostage rescue
operations before the acts are committed. These operations must be
designed to handle the most unexpected contingencies.
For a nation to utilize force against terrorists, certain conditions
must be present. An imminent danger to nationals must exist, both
in the situation at hand and in the immediate future. The imminency
requirement should be liberally construed to allow nations to utilize
force to apprehend terrorists otherwise likely to go unpunished. Unen-
forced prohibitions against violent acts present a danger to the world
community by encouraging future terrorism. To justify the use of
force, the states where hostages are located or where terrorists are ap-
prehended must be unable to take prosecutorial action or assert jurisdic-
tion over the offenders. A state must utilize only that force which is
necessary, proportionate, and limited to the danger at hand. Once ac-
tions are completed, as a matter of custom, nations should report the
incident to the Security Council. Nations that utilize force must be
subject to review by the world community as a whole.
Since veto provisions may prevent the Security Council from acting,
an international tribunal should be designed to evaluate not only uses
of force against terrorism, but also the terroristic acts themselves.
Should such a tribunal be formed, nations such as Egypt may be
more willing to deliver offenders for trial where a political problem
is presented in exercising jurisdiction over the terrorists. If the ter-
rorists and nations know that a neutral tribunal and a fair trial are
available, the extradition process may be encouraged.
As commentators have argued, deterring terrorism is largely de-
pendent upon the extradition process. 265 Professor Murphy has in
fact suggested that the "political offense exception," which exculpates
264 N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
265 Comment, supra note 189, at 250.
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criminal acts from liability if politically motivated, be eliminated
subject to certain requirements. 266 Other commentators have suggested
that in order to clarify the right to use force in anticipation of future
attacks, the Article 51 "armed attack threshold" should include
internal subversion.2 67 Unquestionably, nations should have the right
to respond in anticipation of situations where mass destruction is
threatened. The question remains as to which uses of force are
permissible and which would be merely disguised acts of aggression.
This can be determined only by review of the international community
as a whole, preferrably in an international tribunal independent of
the Security Council.
By encouraging nations to take enforcement actions against inter-
national terrorism, the United States has contributed to the reaffir-
mation of principles and purposes of international treaties and of
the rule of law. If even one terrorist is deterred from causing de-
struction, the action of the United States should be considered val-
uable to the world community. By utilizing force to bring terrorists
to justice, the United States has contributed to re-establishing world
order and has set a valuable precedent for the future.
J. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 45-56 (1985). Professor
Murphy would insure that in extraditing offenders, the accused would not be subject
to persecution for political, racial, or religious beliefs. See also Murphy, The Release
of Abbas: Political Realities Outweigh International Treaties, Baltimore Sun, Nov.
20, 1985, at DI, where Professor Murphy notes the political realities of Abbas'
release and its contravention of extradition treaties.
261 Wallace, International Law and the Use of Force, 19 INT'L LAW. 259, 270
(1985).
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